Group A streptococci (GAS) are an important cause of severe, life-threatening illness among the elderly population, particularly those individuals residing in long-term care facilities (LTCFs). Outbreaks of GAS infection are potentially devastating in this vulnerable population and often require large-scale control efforts involving LTCF staff, public health officials, and infectious diseases practitioners. Although multiple outbreaks of GAS infection in LTCFs have been described in the medical literature, this topic has not been reviewed for 15 years, and there is a need for updated guidance on how to approach GAS infection outbreak control. We reviewed published documents on GAS infection in LTCFs to describe the current understanding of the disease's epidemiology in this setting, identify techniques for outbreak investigation and prevention, and expose areas where additional research is needed. We highlight well-accepted prevention and control strategies that can be employed during investigation and control of GAS infection outbreaks in LTCFs.
lines for the prevention of invasive GAS disease among household contacts of case patients and in postpartum and postsurgical settings have been published [6] , but the unique features of LTCFs and their populations require a specifically tailored strategy. In preparation for guideline development, we reviewed the literature on GAS disease in LTCFs, which has not been summarized in 15 years. We describe the epidemiology of both sporadic and epidemic GAS infections in LTCFs, identify potential prevention and control strategies, and highlight areas for future research. By encapsulating the published literature, we provide health care and infection-control practitioners with a resource on which to base outbreak-control decisions.
METHODS
We systematically reviewed the English-language literature on invasive GAS infection (i.e., infection of a normally sterile site) and noninvasive GAS infection in LTCFs that was published from 1950 through 2006. We searched the PubMed and Embase electronic databases by crossing the terms "group A streptococcus," "streptococcus pyogenes," "necrotizing fasciitis," "streptococcal toxic shock," or "streptococcal infections" with "long-term care," "nursing homes," "homes for the aged," "disease outbreak," or "skilled nursing facilities." Additional studies were identified through searches of reference lists. Unpublished data were obtained through the authors' involvement with relevant outbreak investigations for which Centers for Disease Control and Prevention assistance was requested. We use the term LTCFs to include nursing homes, homes for the elderly population, skilled nursing facilities, geriatric homes, geriatric hospitals, and geriatric rehabilitation units.
RESULTS

The Burden of GAS Infection in LTCFs
Although it is probable that GAS disease has occurred in LTCFs since they came into existence, the first published description of GAS infection among LTCF residents was a 1981 report of 2 unrelated cases of GAS pneumonia in British nursing home residents [7] . Both residents died after a rapidly progressive illness. For each case of pneumonia, the same GAS strain was cultured from specimens from residential staff who were asymptomatic or had mild disease. In subsequent hospitalbased studies in Colorado and Ohio, 21% and 29% of invasive GAS cases, respectively, occurred in LTCF residents [8, 9] . Of 257 hospitalized patients with cases of invasive GAS infection identified through passive surveillance in Florida from 1996 through 2000, 7% occurred in LTCF residents, 21% of whom died [10, 11] .
In the 1990s, 2 active, population-based surveillance systems in North America began tracking invasive GAS disease, defined as illness associated with GAS isolated from a normally sterile site. As of 1993, the Ontario Group A Streptococcal Study covered a catchment population of ∼11 million, almost 40% of the Canadian population. During the period 1992-1993, 4% of cases of invasive GAS infection occurred in LTCF residents [3] . In later analyses of this surveillance data, LTCF residents accounted for 12% of pneumonia cases [12] , 10% of NF cases [13] , and 5% of invasive soft-tissue infections due to GAS [14] .
In the United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's Active Bacterial Core surveillance (ABCs) covers a 2007 surveillance population of 30 million people (∼10% of the US population) from 10 geographically diverse sites. Unlike Ontario surveillance, ABCs also tracks infections in which GAS is isolated from a wound in patients with NF or streptococcal toxic shock syndrome. In ABCs, 7% of invasive GAS infections identified from 1998 through 2003 occurred among LTCF residents, who most often presented with bacteremia with unknown focus, pneumonia, or cellulitis. Using 2000 census information on residence, ABCs investigators estimated that 600 cases of invasive GAS infection and 200 deaths occurred among LTCF residents in the United States in that year alone [15] . Site-specific analyses of ABCs data from the Atlanta, Georgia, metropolitan area and from Minnesota estimated that 10% and 8% of invasive GAS infections, respectively, occurred in LTCF residents [16, 17] . Compared with community residents of the same age, the incidence of invasive GAS infection was 3-to 8-fold higher among elderly LTCF residents [15] [16] [17] , and LTCF residents were 1.5 times more likely to die (table 1) [15] .
Cluster and Outbreak Investigations
Basic outbreak epidemiology. GAS infection outbreaks in LTCFs in the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom are summarized in tables 2 and 3. Three additional articles summarize several outbreaks each [18] [19] [20] . Most outbreaks occurred in the winter and spring, mirroring seasonal GAS infection patterns in the general population [21] . Outbreaks lasted from !1 month to nearly 1 year and varied greatly in tempo of outbreak progression; some evolved within weeks [19, [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] , whereas others were characterized by intermittent occurrence of cases over several months [24, [27] [28] [29] [30] .
Attack rates (range, 1%-30%), case fatality ratios (range, 0%-100%), and presenting syndromes ranged broadly. In several outbreaks, a correlation between the residents' underlying health status and the severity of GAS disease was evident. An outbreak in a geropsychiatric unit housing primarily ambulatory residents with few underlying chronic physical conditions manifested with noninvasive disease [31] , whereas severe illnesses, such as NF and pneumonia, were more often reported in outbreaks in facilities housing physically debilitated residents with multiple comorbid conditions [25, 27, 32] . Concurrent GAS illness in staff members was not always reported, but when described, it was much less severe than disease in residents [28] [29] [30] 32] . Staff illnesses included pharyngitis, pneumonia, and skin infections, with no published reports of NF, streptococcal toxic shock syndrome, or death among care givers.
The association between severity of GAS illness and underlying resident health status was not uniform, however. In several outbreaks, disease presentation among residents with similar functional levels ranged from mild soft-tissue infection to rapidly progressive fatal illness. This range of disease presentation often delayed recognition that clinically disparate illnesses were caused by a single organism [27] [28] [29] .
Case identification and recovery of GAS from LTCF residents, staff, and environs. Although most investigations were initiated by LTCF personnel, several outbreaks were detected through ongoing community surveillance [3, 16] or by astute hospital staff who identified patients with GAS infection from a Confirmed cases are culture-confirmed cases of GAS disease. Probable cases are clinical illness consistent with GAS disease without culture confirmation but with other laboratory data supporting a diagnosis of GAS infection (anti-DNAse B titer of у1:340, 2-fold increase in anti-DNAse B titer, antistreptozyme titer of у1:300, antistreptolysin O titer of 11:200, or rapid test result positive for Streptococcus species). Suspected cases are clinical illness consistent with GAS disease without supporting laboratory data. Presence of the outbreak strain was determined through serotyping, PFGE, or emm typing. b Attack rates and case fatality ratios are based on the total no. of confirmed, probable, and suspected cases of GAS disease. c Deaths occurring during the outbreak were attributed to GAS disease, unless an alternate cause of death was clearly described in the article. d M or T type identified through serologic testing; emm type identified by gene sequence typing.
a common residence [27, 30, 32] . Case-finding methods included a review of LTCF medical charts and records from referral hospitals or laboratories; active surveillance for fever, wounds, and other illnesses among residents; and monitoring of employee absences.
Characterization of GAS strains isolated from patients or carriers helped to describe the extent of several outbreaks. In 1 investigation, GAS infections continued despite improvement in infection-control practices. Cases that followed remediation efforts had a different Lancefield M-type (a designation based on serologic testing to differentiate GAS strains) than did the cases occurring before remediation, indicating that the newer cases were part of a separate outbreak. With a renewed focus on infection control, the second outbreak was successfully controlled [23] . In other outbreaks, 2 distinct GAS strains were found to be circulating in the home concurrently, indicating that GAS introduction had occurred through separate infection-control breaches on different occasions [20, 26] . In 15 outbreak investigations, all facility residents were screened to identify GAS colonization, whereas 2 investigations limited screening to close contacts of case patients [30, 33] . Among residents, GAS carriage ranged from 0% to 34% (table  3) ; GAS was cultured from the oropharynx [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] 32] , skin (intact or interrupted) [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] , urine [24] , and gastrostomy sites (D.C.B., unpublished data). In several outbreaks, screening identified carriage of the outbreak strain in residents who were immobilized or living on wards where no cases had occurred [24, 25, 29] . In most published investigations, all available LTCF staff were screened for GAS colonization, but several investigators only screened symptomatic staff or those staff closely linked to ill patients. Carriage of GAS among staff was identified in 9 of 12 investigations in which all staff members were screened; staff carriage rates were 2%-9% [22] [23] [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] [29] 32] (D.C.B., unpublished data). In 4 other outbreaks, only staff who were symptomatic or had close contact with case patients were screened; carriage was found in 2 of these outbreaks, occurring in 8% and 10% of screened staff [19, 30, 31, 33] . Serological testing for GAS was used to categorize residents as patients or carriers in some early reports [29, 32, 33] but was rarely used after the mid-1990s, when PFGE and emm typing became available to assess strain relatedness.
Environmental cultures were performed in several investigations, with varied results. Sampling of fomites and shared surfaces in a 1981 outbreak yielded no GAS [28] , and only 1 environmental culture obtained during extensive investigation of 2 US outbreaks in 1991 grew GAS [20] . However, in other outbreak investigations, GAS was cultured from water fountain spigots, ashtrays, carpets and furniture, commode and bed handles, and a whirlpool tub used for patient bathing [31, 34] (D.C.B., unpublished data). In no outbreak, however, were fomites proven to cause GAS transmission.
Introduction and transmission of GAS in LTCFs. In 2 outbreaks, the index patient entered the LTCF with unrecognized GAS illness [22, 32] , but in most outbreaks, the earliest identified cases occurred in established LTCF residents. Spatial clustering of cases within facility wards or units and among roommates has been reported [18-20, 23, 25, 32] . Two investigations evaluated whether having a roommate with GAS disease or carriage was associated with an elevated risk of disease; one investigation found an elevated risk in multivariable analysis [27] , and the other found an elevated risk that narrowly missed statistical significance [25] . However, other outbreaks involved multiple wards [19, 25, 26, 28] , including locked areas, suggesting that care givers had transferred GAS between patients. The role of staff in initiating or propagating GAS infection outbreaks is supported in several other investigations, including 2 investigations in which immobilized, isolated patients appeared to serve as reservoirs of infection from which staff repeatedly recirculated the organism among other residents [24, 29] . In multiple instances, investigators found that staff members with GAS pharyngitis had cared for case patients prior to the outbreaks [23, 30, 33] , although isolates were not available to confirm that staff and patient cases were due to the same strains.
Disease transmission between visitors and LTCF residents was described less frequently than staff-resident transmission. Having frequent visitors was found to be a risk factor for carriage of the outbreak strain in a Georgia outbreak; however, review of concurrent invasive GAS cases in a larger Georgia population did not identify community infections caused by the outbreak strain [25] . Four other investigations that assessed the role of having frequent visitors did not find an association with elevated risk of disease or carriage [23, 26, 27, 32] .
Retrospective cohort and case-control studies were used to identify additional risk factors in multiple outbreaks (table 4) [23, [25] [26] [27] 32] . Requiring significant nursing assistance and being bedridden were risk factors for disease in several outbreaks of noninvasive disease [20] . In another study, requiring a bed bath was a risk factor for disease, whereas other markers of disability were not, suggesting that close contact between staff and patients during a bed bath was a more important risk for transmission than was a resident's underlying health status [26] . Receiving skin treatment or having nonintact skin were risk factors for disease or carriage in several studies [20, 25, 27] . Although it was not evaluated as a risk factor for GAS infection, concurrent influenza or influenza-like illness outbreaks were identified during several GAS infection outbreaks in LTCFs [12, 26] .
In multiple outbreak investigations, inadequate infectioncontrol practices were either directly observed [24, 29] or identified through staff surveys [25, 26] . Lapses included reuse of washcloths among multiple patients [24] , failure to use gloves during wound care [26, 29] , and inadequate staff hand washing facilities [26, 27] . In addition, employees reported working while sick because of staffing shortages or insufficient sick leave in 2 outbreaks [26] (D.C.B., unpublished data).
Outbreak-control measures. Seven of 17 outbreaks described in tables 2 and 3 ended after improvements in infectioncontrol practices and treatment of GAS carriage with antibiotics. In 3 outbreaks in which no carriage was identified, remediation focused on infection control alone. One frequently recommended intervention was to increase the convenience of [15, 17] Exposure to child with pharyngitis [4] у3 Persons in household [4] a Underlying illnesses [3, 4, 13, 17] (HIV infection, diabetes mellitus, cardiac disease, cancer, chronic lung disease) Corticosteroid use [4] History of alcohol abuse [3] History of injection drug use [4] Predisposing skin lesion (e.g., surgery, blunt or penetrating trauma)
[13] Risk factors identified in у1 case-control or cohort study during investigations of GAS infection outbreaks in LTCFs
Having a roommate with GAS disease or carriage [27, 32] Having frequent visitors [25] Chronic illness; poor functional level [23] Cardiac disease (current CHF or history of MI) [26] Receiving skin treatment or having non-intact skin [25, 27] Requiring bed bath [26] Potential risk factors for GAS in LTCF residents
Exposure to staff with pharyngitis [22, 23, 30, 33] Poor infection control implementation [24, 29] Concurrent or preceding viral respiratory infection [26] NOTE. CHF, congestive heart failure; LTCF, long-term care facility; MI, myocardial infarction. a Referent group, 1 or 2 persons in household [4] .
hand washing, a step recently made simpler by the availability of alcohol-based handrubs [26, 27] . One facility screened all newly admitted patients for GAS carriage for 2 months after the outbreak; no carriage was identified [28] . Improvements in sick leave policy were recommended in instances in which care givers reported pressure to work while ill for financial or staffing reasons [23] (D.C.B., unpublished data). Investigators theorized that environmental remediation led to control of 1 outbreak [34] . Cohorting of ill and colonized patients and restriction of transfers to and from other facilities were attempted in several outbreaks; no efforts to restrict staff movements within LTCFs were described. Cohorting of immunocompromised patients early during 1 outbreak was speculated to have prevented disease in this vulnerable group [33] . However, cohorting was difficult to apply in facilities with demented or mentally ill patients [19, 23, 31] . In such situations, compensatory interventions included attempts to disinfect residents with germicidal soap [23] or enforce routine bathing [31] .
All facility residents were given empirical antibiotics in 5 investigations (table 3) , as well as in 2 outbreaks summarized elsewhere [18, 19] . Mass therapy was recommended early in the course of some investigations on the basis of the perceived severity of the outbreaks [24, 32] but was usually reserved for when new GAS infections appeared despite attempts to improve infection control and provide targeted antibiotic therapy for persons with carriage or disease [24, 28, 31] . In an outbreak in an LTCF in which residents were ambulatory but mentally disabled (complicating screening and cohorting), mass antibiotic treatment ended the outbreak after several stages of escalating infection-control measures failed [31] . Although mass antibiotic therapy appeared to help curtail some of the outbreaks in which it was employed, 1 report noted persistent circulation of the outbreak strain within a facility where multiple breaches in infection-control practices occurred [24] . Only 1 article described surveillance for adverse effects of antibiotics after mass therapy; none were identified [32] .
Mass antibiotic therapy was not administered in a 2001 Georgia outbreak that persisted despite enhanced infection control and treatment of GAS carriers with azithromycin. Reinvestigation revealed opportunities for hand hygiene improvement and found that receiving skin care was a risk factor for GAS disease or carriage among residents. Infection control was improved, emphasizing hand hygiene and wound care procedures, and antibiotic therapy targeting carriers was repeated using penicillin and rifampin. No further cases occurred [27] .
DISCUSSION
GAS infection is a significant cause of illness and death among LTCF residents. Outbreaks of GAS infection in LTCFs are not uncommon and can be devastating in this vulnerable population. The burden of disease identified by our review is likely to be an underestimate, because most current surveillance systems capture invasive disease only, and because it is likely that many outbreaks are never recognized, let alone published. Spe- Table 5 . Approaches to control of group A streptococcal (GAS) infection outbreaks in long-term care facilities (LTCFs).
Category Approaches
Common and well-accepted approaches Encourage rigorous hand hygiene among LTCF staff, residents, and visitors Institute employee sick leave policies that discourage employees from working while ill Provide specific employee education on recognition of GAS infections and on the importance of basic hygiene and adherence to sick leave policies Hospital or referral laboratory staff should notify LTCF if a resident receives a diagnosis of GAS infection Perform on-site evaluation of infection-control policy implementation Perform surveillance for pharyngitis and skin infections among residents and staff; maintain a low threshold for culturing skin and throat lesions Store GAS isolates until outbreak ceases for potential strain characterization cific, long-term data on the incidence of GAS infection among LTCF residents are lacking, but there is no suggestion that this problem is diminishing; it may, in fact, be growing as the US population ages.
Although we identified multiple approaches to controlling GAS infection outbreaks in LTCFs, we could not adequately assess the effectiveness of most of these measures; postinvestigation follow-up for new cases of GAS infection was not routinely reported. In addition, outbreak response typically involved multiple, simultaneously implemented interventions, making it impossible to determine which intervention or interventions were responsible for interrupting GAS transmission.
Nevertheless, approaches to GAS infection outbreak control identified in this review can be placed into 3 categories: those that are common and well-accepted, those that are unlikely to be harmful but are of less clear benefit, and those that require additional research before they can be recommended (table 5) . The most important outbreak-control strategies for GAS infection, those relating to hand hygiene and employee sick leave policies, are already part of routine LTCF infection control [35] and are key, not only to outbreak response, but also to the prevention of initial cases. On-site assessment of infection-control practices is a crucial step in outbreak investigation; direct observation of staff behaviors, assessment of hand washing facility availability and convenience, and anonymous employee surveys can be used to identify problem areas.
Investigators may wish to consider certain less-proven interventions, depending on outbreak severity, facility size, and resource availability. During implementation of infection-control recommendations and other outbreak-control measures, admissions of new patients from hospitals to LCTFs could be halted temporarily. Although cohorting is often difficult to implement, separating severely immunosuppressed patients from other residents during an outbreak may prevent GAS transmission to a particularly vulnerable subgroup. If screening cultures for GAS colonization are performed, areas of skin breakdown and ostomies should be screened, in addition to the oropharynx.
Further research is required to determine the value of several other potential prevention and control strategies. Whether a single GAS case in an LTCF should trigger a full-scale investigation is uncertain; data are limited as a result of publication bias, because descriptions of successful containment of isolated cases of GAS infection do not appear in the literature. The ideal approaches to screening for asymptomatic GAS carriage and prophylactic antibiotic use are also unclear. Limited screening of an infected resident's close contacts is far less costly than screening an entire facility but may miss carriage in patients or staff who have an important role in GAS transmission. Mass antibiotic prophylaxis may decrease carriage of the outbreak strain and interrupt transmission but is costly, and potential adverse reactions to antibiotics are a concern. Widespread an-tibiotic prophylaxis also could promote the development of antibiotic resistance in GAS strains, as well as in other organisms that commonly infect or colonize LTCF residents [36] . Further study also is required to understand the role of fomites in GAS transmission, and creative strategies are needed to prevent transmission among residents whose mental status prevents adequate implementation of infection-control practices.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention plans to convene a panel of experts in the clinical management and epidemiology of GAS and the unique characteristics of the LTCF population to formulate guidelines for the prevention and control of GAS disease in LTCFs, including topics for which published evidence is lacking. Meanwhile, this review provides updated information that infectious diseases specialists, infection-control practitioners, and other health care providers can employ when investigating and managing GAS infection outbreaks in LTCFs.
